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Auction-Rate Securities: A Fast & Furious Fall

I. INTRODUCTION
An owner of a laser-surgery business who lost access to
more than ninety percent of his life savings after his UBS broker
marketed "cash-equivalent" securities with no "market risk," a law
professor unable to liquidate $75,000 of invested money to pay for
her sons' pending tuition bills and a Chicago hospital whose
interest payments increased by more than fifty percent on
securities issued to raise money have one thing in common.' Each
are victims of the collapse of the auction-rate securities market,
stunning both in the unprecedented size of a market brought to its
knees and the rapidity at which it collapsed.2 The $330 billion
market for auction-rate securities imploded in early February
2008.' Auction-rate securities are variable-interest rate, long-term
securities that were marketed to individual, retail investors and
institutional investors as cash equivalents by many of Wall Street's
leading financial institutions.4 The fundamental design of auctionrate securities, however, demonstrates that they are not cash
1. Peter Caronara, Nonprofits Feel the Debt Squeeze Too, Bus. WK., Nov. 17,
2008, at 77 (discussing Swedish Covenant Hospital in Chicago's increased interest
payments on auction-rate securities that it issue); Gretchen Morgenson, It's a Long,
Cold, Cashless Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at C2, available at 2008 WLNR
6899702 [hereinafter Cashless Siege] (discussing the plight of Craig Joffe, the
Minnesota business-owner who has unexpectedly lost liquidity in more than ninety
percent of his investments after a UBS broker invested in auction-rate securities);
Gretchen Morgenson, The Investors Who Can't Come In From the Cold, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2008, at BUl, available at 2008 WLNR 22925632 [hereinafter Come In From
The Cold] (discussing the situation of Irene Scharf, a Massachusetts law professor,
who can't liquidate $75,000 of auction-rate securities earmarked to pay for her sons'
tuition bills).
2. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
3. Melanie Cherdack et al., Auction Rate Securities: The New Frontier,
PRACTICING LAW INST., Aug. 6, 2008, available at WESTLAW, 1686 PLI/Corp335;
Kimberly M. Melvin & Cara Tseng Duffield, Alert: Auction-Rate Securities Claims: Is
the Worst Yet to Come?, WILEY REIN LLP ARTICLES (Wiley Rein LLP, Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.wileyrein.com/publication.cfm?publication-id=13726;
Stephanie Lee, Auction-Rate Securities: Bidder's Remorse? A Primer,MONDAQ, May
9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8761193.
4. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
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equivalents.5 Liquidity in the auction-rate securities market is
dependent on the number of willing sellers being equaled or
exceeded by the number of willing buyers.6 To maintain liquidity,
financial institutions bid on their own securities, creating a false
sense of demand in the minds of investors.7 Brokers' failure to
disclose to potential investors that an adequate level of demand
was often achieved only after the issuing financial institutions bid
on the securities themselves to prevent an auction failure became
common practice.8 Also, investors were not informed that
financial institutions were not bound to place such supporting bids
and that without such voluntary support, the viability of the
market and the liquidity of the securities would be in jeopardy.9
Such conduct by the financial institutions that issued auction-rate
securities and managed auctions likely exposed them to liability
for deception or misrepresentation, grounds for civil fraud claims. 0
State Attorneys General, the Securities and Exchange
Commission [hereinafter SEC], and the Financial Industry
Regulatory
Authority
[hereinafter
FINRA]
launched
investigations into the practice of auction-rate securities issuers."
These investigations have resulted in criminal charges as well as
civil lawsuits by both individual investors and state Attorneys
General and large pre-trial settlements. 2 Such settlements have
usually restored liquidity to retail, charitable organization and
small business clients while exempting larger institutional
investors." A few suits have been filed by both individual and
institutional investors.14 The good news for both investors who
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Cathy Lockman, The Collapse of the Auction Rate Market, PERSP., Fall 2008,
8, 10, http://www.business.illinois.edu/publications/perspectives/2008-fall.pdf (noting
that the type of misrepresentation that issuing financial institutions are accused of
may be grounds for civil fraud); Cherdack et. al., supra note 3.
11. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Infra notes 203-217 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Amir Efrati, Auction-Rate Securities Suit Against UBS Can
Proceed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122168000684548751.html [hereinafter Suit Against UBSJ (discussing a suit by an
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wish to liquidate their holdings and issuing financial institutions
concerned about the costs of liability is that the underlying value
of the securities have not been affected by the collapse of
While seemingly legitimate claims that brokers
demand. 5
wrongfully misrepresented the safety of auction-rate securities are
common, a coordinated public-private approach to settling claims
and restoring liquidity has prevented a flood of litigation claims by
investors and allowed for a slow but orderly restoration of liquidity
for many investors."
II. OVERVIEW OF THE AUCTION-RATE SECURITIES MARKET

A.

The Appeal of Auction-Rate Securities

Auction-rate securities were developed in the early 1980s
to satisfy demand for advantageous investment products in a
market constrained by high inflation rates.17 American Express
debuted auction-rate securities in July 1984.18 The variable
interest-rate component of auction-rate securities provided issuers
lower financing costs by continually matching interest rates to
market conditions.' 9 In October 2007, auction-rate securities'
20
interest rates were as low as 3.66 percent. In effect, this provided
issuers short-term interest rates for long-term debt. 2' A typical
institutional investors against UBS which survived a motion to dismiss); Daniel C.
Girard, Billions to Answer For, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.girardgibbs.com/legaltimes.pdf (discussing the relatively low number of
individual investors suits related to the collapse of the auction-rate securities market
and the potential for additional suits to be filed despite the large settlements);
Brendan Pierson, Class Action Launched Against H&R Block Over ARS, LAW360,
Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.law360.com (discussing a class action suit filed against
H&R Block).
15. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Lee, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Auction Rate Securities Market: HearingBefore the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv..
110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter Norwood] (Written Testimony of Leslie Norwood,
Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association).
a
21. Id. ("Auction rate bonds offered issuers an attractive cost of financing,
maturity of thirty-years or longer, and the flexibility to call the bond at any time.");
John Fazio et al., The Genesis of a Troubled Product: Auction Rate Securities,
PRACTICING LAW INST., Aug. 6, 2008, available at Westlaw, 1686 PLI/Corp325 ("By
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auction-rate securities' term is twenty to thirty years.22 However,
some auction-rate securities are perpetual.23 Such securities,
primarily those issued by closed-end mutual funds, comprise2
roughly twenty-five percent of the auction-rate securities market. 1
For investors, auction-rate securities were beneficial as they paid
an interest rate that was, on average, roughly one percentage point
more than money market funds.25
Dealing in auction-rate securities was a profitable business
for many financial institutions. Issuing the securities generated
substantial fees for investment banking customers, usually 1.5
percent of the amount of money raised. 27 Banks also generated
funds, usually twenty-five basis points annually, for managing the
auctions. 2' Furthermore, each time clients bought and sold the
securities in the auction process, issuing banks earned additional
fees.29

B.

Types of A uction-Rate Securities

Auction-rate securities are often referred to by different
names based on the type of issuer: "Auction Market Preferred
Stock," "Variable Rate Preferred Securities," "Money Market3
Preferred Securities," and "Periodic Auction Rate Securities. 0
The bulk of the auction-rate securities market is composed of
three types of issuers. 31 At the end of 2007, fifty percent of
auction-rate securities were issued by municipalities in the form of

agreeing to a regular and frequent schedule of matching interest rates with market
conditions through an auction process, lenders became willing to acquire long-term
debt from borrowers in return for the payment of interest at short-term rates.").
22. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
23. Lee, supra note 3.
24. Id.
25. Gretchen Morgenson, As Good as Cash, Until It's Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2008, at BU1, availableat 2008 WLNR 4643958 [hereinafter As Good As Cash].
26. Infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
27. Cherdack et al., supra note 3; Cashless Siege, supra note 1.
28. Cashless Siege, supra note 1.
29. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
30.

MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC., DESCRIPTION OF MERRIL LYNCH'S AUCTION

RATE SECURITIES PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, 3 (May 31, 2006), http://ml.com/

media/70501.pdf.
31. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
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bonds.3 2 Another twenty-six percent were auction-rate bonds
issued by student loan lenders.33 Nineteen percent were "preferred
equity instruments" or auction-rate preferred securities, primarily
issued by closed-end mutual funds. 4 Such funds issued auctionrate securities to enhance returns for common shareholders by
leveraging the portfolio.35 Investors earned the "spread" between
the returns of the portfolio and the rate paid to auction-rate
securities holders.16 The remaining five percent of the auction-rate
securities market includes issuers such as corporations and
collateralized debt obligations.37
C.

Size of the Auction-Rate Securities Market

The size of the auction-rate securities market grew
exponentially in recent years to approximately $330 billion in early
2008.38 Several years ago, banks expanded their market by
lowering the minimum investment requirement for auction-rate
securities from $250,000 to $25,000.29 This shift opened the market
to a wide array of retail investors. Furthermore, beginning in
2005, pressure from accounting firms and the SEC to stop listing
auction-rate securities as "cash equivalents" on financial
statements caused many corporations to decrease the size of their
auction-rate securities holdings.4 ' Consequently, banks began to
market auction-rate securities more aggressively to retail investors,
who frequently failed to understand
the nature of the financial
• 41
product they were purchasing.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Thomas Humphreys, Closed-End Fund Auction Rate Securities Relief, June
20, 2008, MONDAQ, available at 2008 WLNR 11695516.
36. Id.
37. Lee, supra note 3.
38. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
39. As Good As Cash, supra note 25.
40. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
41. Girard, supra note 14.
42. Id.
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The Auction Process

Investors purchase auction-rate securities at par value
when they are issued.4 3 Subsequently, interest-rates are reset via a
type of auction known as a "Dutch auction."" Auctions are held
every seven, twenty-eight, thirty-five or forty-nine days and are
facilitated by either the issuing bank or another financial
institution.45 Customarily, broker-dealers survey the market prior
to each auction and provide advice, known as "price talk," to their
clients regarding their belief as to what interest rate is likely to be
set at the next auction. 4' An interested investor may place a "buy"
order for auction-rate securities at a given interest rate. 47 The
investor is committing to purchase the securities as long as the
clearing rate is set at or above the investor's required level.48
Current holders of auction-rate securities can place three
types of orders. 49 First, a holder can place a sell order ordering his
broker to sell his securities regardless of the auction's clearing
rate.5 ° Second, a holder can tell his broker that he wishes to
continue to hold the securities regardless of the clearing rate."
Finally, a holder can issue a "hold-at-rate" order.52 This last order
is an instruction to a broker that holders wish to hold securities
a specified rate.53
only if the clearing rate meets or exceeds
4
securities.
the
Otherwise, the broker will sell
The clearing-rate is set at the lowest possible interest rate
at which all securities up for auction are able to be matched with

43. Class Action Petition, at 8, La Grave v. H&R Block Inc., No. 3:08-cv-667,
(S.D. Ill.
Aug. 14, 2008); Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
44. Class Action Petition, supra note 43. A "Dutch" auction is an auction "where
the price [is] set at an unattractive level and then made more attractive to prospective
buyers throughout the course of the auction." Id.
45. Cherdack et al., supra note 3; Lee, supra note 3.
46. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Lee, supra note 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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buyers.55 Securities are allocated to investors based on the
following priority: "(1) Hold Orders; (2) Hold-at-rate and buy bids
with a rate below the clearing rate; (3) Hold-at-rate orders with a
rate at the clearing rate; and (4) Buy bids with a rate at the
clearing rate."56 If there are too many buyers at the clearing rate
relative to the available securities, bidders will be allocated
securities on a pro-rata basis.57 Typically, existing holders have
priority.
There are two situations in which a clearing-rate is not set:
an "all-hold" auction and a failed auction."9 An "all-hold" auction
occurs when all existing holders of the auction-rate securities up
for auction want to hold the securities regardless of the interest
rate paid.6° In this case, the interest rate for the next time period
reverts to the "all-hold" rate, which is set in the offering
prospectus.1 Usually, this rate is disadvantageous
to investors as it
62
tends to be a "below-market rate.,

An auction failure occurs whenever the number of
securities demanded by buyers is less than the number of securities
up for auction by existing holders.63 If this occurs, all existing
holders who wish to sell are not able to.64 Should an auction fail,
the interest rate for the subsequent time period, until the next
auction, reverts to a "penalty" or "maximum rate."65 Like the "allhold" rate, the "penalty" rate is set forth in the prospectus. 66 The
"penalty rate" is usually an "above-market" rate, "designed to
compensate the investor for this loss of liquidity and to encourage
the issuer to redeem or restructure the securities., 67 The "penalty"
rate is either a fixed rate or a specified multiple of a benchmark
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lee, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lee, supra note 3.
Id.
Norwood, supra note 20.
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rate such as London Interbank Offered Rate [hereinafter
LIBOR]. 68 LIBOR is the rate at which most "creditworthy banks"
charge each other for large Eurodollar (U.S. currency held in
foreign banks) loans.69 While receiving the "penalty" rate is more
lucrative for the investors than receiving the "all-hold" rate, the
investors are unable to liquidate their holdings. ° The "penalty"
rates that investors receive following a failed auction vary widely
based on the issuer of a given auction-rate security.71 Specifically,
the "penalty" rates for auction-rate securities issued by
municipalities are usually substantially higher than those issued by
closed-end mutual funds.72 For example, following a February 12,
2008, auction failure, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey was paying interest at a "penalty" rate of twenty percent on
71
one issue of auction-rate securities.
Meanwhile, the average
"penalty" rate for closed-end funds during March 2008 was only
3.8 percent.74
The market for auction-rate securities is almost exclusively
controlled by the financial institution responsible for managing the
auction process.75 Investors wishing to liquidate their securities
have no consistent alternative to the designated auction process. 76
Generally, an auction failure results in both a simultaneous benefit
and detriment for the investor.77 While the investor usually
receives the benefit of higher interest payments via the "penalty
rate," her investment becomes illiquid for a potentially lengthy
period.7 8

68. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
69. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE & INVESTMENT TERMS 171 (3d ed. 1991). See also
Justin Wong, LIBOR Left in Limbo; A Callfor More Reform, 13 NC BANK. INST, 365
(2009).
70. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
71. Lee, supra note 3; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
72. Lee, supra note 3; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
73. Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC On Auction Rate Securities Market Issues,
BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/bnkd.
htm [hereinafter Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC].
74. Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Lee, supra note 3.
Id.
Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
Id.
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III. How THE MARKET FAILED
The economic downturn and the tightening of credit
markets in 2007 dampened demand for auction-rate securities.
Leslie Norwood, Managing Director and Associate General
Counsel of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association, explained some of the contributing causes of the
collapse of the auction-rate securities market to the House
Committee on Financial Services:
As problems in the mortgage market spread into the
mortgage securitization market in 2007, faith in the
monocline insurers who insured mortgage bonds
and collateralized debt obligations began to waiver.
Investors became wary of being exposed to anything
with the potential for downgrades, including any
securities insured by the monocline insurers and
third-party credit enhanced bonds in general.
Because of the critical role the insurers and third
party credit enhancers play in the auction rate
securities market, demand for ARS began to decline
sharply, ultimately resulting in failures across the
auction rate securities market; in spite of the fact
that the underlying credit ratings of ARS issuers
have remained high.a°
The risk of auction failure increased as the number of buyers
decreased to a level where the number of sellers exceeded the
number of buyers.8' Charles Bowsher, former U.S. Comptroller
General, blamed the collapse of the auction-rate securities market
on the decline in availability of short-term financing: "The auction
system is dependent on the availability of short-term financing.
When short-term financing seized up and the investment banks
didn't step up to the plate to support the auctions as they had in

79. Lee, supra note 3; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
80. Norwood, supra note 20.
81. Lee, supra note 3.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 13

the past, the whole system froze."82 A few auctions failed during
late 2007. 8' However, most failures were issues that "had less
creditworthy issuers." 84 The failures did, however, cause several
S 85
corporations to write down their auction-rate securities holdings.
Nevertheless, the rate of auction failure remained low: by the end
of 2007 there were only forty-four recorded auction failures since
their inception in 1984.86

A.

False Auction Support

Often, auction failures were avoided because issuing banks
bid on the excess supply of securities, creating "illusory liquidity"
in the market."' For example, from January 2006 until the collapse
of the auction-rate securities market in early February 2008, UBS
participated in eighty-eight percent of the 30,000 auctions that it
88
managed on behalf of municipalities and student loan agencies.
However, the frequency with which banks prevented auction
Such large
failures increased substantially during 2007.89
proprietary purchases placed substantial pressure on banks to
resell auction-rate securities to their clients to avoid being stuck
with large holdings themselves should market liquidity disappear. 9°
B.

Concern IncreasedDuring 2007

Due to increasing market turmoil during 2007, banks
sought to decrease their own auction-rate securities holdings to
82. Lockman, supra note 10, at 9.
83. Lee, supra note 3.
84. Id.
85. Id. "Writing down" is an accounting mechanism used by corporations to
decrease their tax burden. To achieve this, corporations decrease the value of an
asset on their balancing sheet. The corporation simultaneously reports a
corresponding loss on their income statement. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cherdack et al., supra note 3 ("Having invested their own capital in the ARS
market in order to make a secondary market, broker-dealers had every financial
incentive to sell them to their customers.").
88. Aaron Pressman, The Investment 'Albatross' At UBS,BUS. WK., Aug. 11,

2008, at 22, 23.
89. Cherdack et al., supra note 3; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
90. See Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
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minimize risk. 91
To accomplish this, banks often increased
pressure on their brokers to sell the securities to clients, an action
that has increased banks' perceived liability after the collapse of
the market.92 Internal communications within UBS, later made
public, highlight that conflict. 93
By August 2007, UBS's
proprietary auction-rate securities inventory had tripled in five
months from $1 billion to $3 billion, concerning the firm's risk
managers."
One manager e-mailed David Schulman, UBS's
Global Head for the Municipal Securities Group, to explain that
the firm had "little tolerance for increased inventory" of auctionrate securities.95 The following week, Shulman held a conference
call with 850 brokers to encourage them to promote auction-rate
securities to UBS's Wealth Management clients in order to "move
more product through the system.",16 In a follow-up e-mail, he
implicitly acknowledged the firm's concern about the stability of
the auction-rate securities market by stating: "this is our best and
most effective way of hedging our exposure.' 7
Shulman's
skepticism regarding both UBS's ability to continue to prop up the
auction-rate securities market with the firm's own cash and the
continued viability of the auction-rate securities market was also
evidenced by his simultaneous request for clearance from UBS's
compliance department to sell nearly $500,000 worth of auctionrate securities from his personal account.98
91. Id. See generally Lockman, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing the general theory
behind financial institutions' liability for issuing auction-rate securities); Pressman,
supra note 88 (discussing UBS executives' concern regarding their exposure to risk in
the auction-rate securities market).
92. See, e.g., Pressman, supra note 88 (describing UBS's documented attempt to
minimize its own risk by selling auction-rate securities to clients despite knowledge of
potential turmoil in the market).
93. Id.

94. Id. at 23.
95. Pressman, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 24. See also Liz Rappaport, Auction-Rate Case Settled by Former UBS
Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12

2339911083811849.html (stating that seven UBS executives were investigated for
selling personal holdings of auction-rate securities while the firm was simultaneously
aggressively marketing the securities to its clients. For example, David Aufhauser,
former general counsel for UBS's investment bank, settled with New York Attorney
General. The settlement included the forfeiture of one year's pay ($6 million), a

$500,000 penalty and a ban from practicing law for two years.).
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During the second week of February 2008, due to
decreasing capital reserves and liquidity, most financial institutions

stopped trying to prevent auction failures by purchasing securities
for their own accounts.99 With declining financial positions, banks

reached the upper limit of their risk tolerance for absorbing
auction-rate securities to prevent market failure.'9 For example,

when the market collapsed, UBS had already increased its auctionrate securities inventory by more than $5 billion dollars in early
2008.101 The failures unraveled confidence in the market, and
almost instantly, the majority of the hundreds of daily auctions
failed. °2 While only thirteen auctions failed between 1984 and
2006 and only thirty-one failed during the second half of 2007,
eighty-seven percent of the nearly 400 daily auctions failed on
February 14, 2008.03
In effect, the market for auction-rate
securities disappeared overnight.'O Investors who believed that
they were holding liquid cash-equivalent securities suddenly found
themselves holding illiquid, long-term securities with few

appealing redemption options. 05
IV. PREVIOUS SEC INVESTIGATIONS

The practices of financial institutions involving the auction10 6
market has previously come under SEC scrutiny.
securities
rate
However, these investigations by the SEC provide little guidance
regarding marketing auction-rate securities, meaning financial
institutions may be able to argue that the SEC's lack of action
99. Norwood, supra note 20 ("As the credit markets tightened, the demand for
ARS and other variable rate securities began to show signs of decline and the
number of failed auctions increased.. .The issues in the auction rate securities market
are unprecedented and unexpected and flow from overall issues in the financial
markets.").
100. See Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3 ("Having already suffered billions of
dollars in losses resulting from the subprime mortgage collapse, the investment firms
abruptly ceased their bailout practices.").
101. Bailey Somers, Cuomo Slams UBS With Auction Rate Securities, LAw360,
July 24, 2008, http://www.law360.com.
102. Norwood, supra note 20.
103. Id.
104. Cherdack et al., supra note 3; see Lee, supra note 3.
105. Id.
106. Infra notes 108-109 (discussing the 1995 settlement with Lehman Brothers)
and note 107 (discussing the 2006 settlement with 15 financial institutions).
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estops the agency from engaging in enforcement actions now.
The first of two principal cases in which the SEC scrutinized the
auction-rate securities market occurred in 1995, when Lehman
Brothers was charged and ultimately fined $850,000 by the SEC
for illegally manipulating auctions that it managed on behalf of
American Express.
Second, during 2006, the SEC settled a
multi-year investigation into the practices of fifteen financial
institutions who were marketing auction-rate securities and
managing the "Dutch" auction process. 109 During the investigation
that led to the joint-2006 settlement, the SEC discovered, among
other findings, that broker-dealers had misled investors regarding
both the liquidity and risk associated with investing in auction-rate
securities and their own role in maintaining liquidity in the market
by preventing auction failure.10 The SEC ruled that these actions
constituted violations of the Security Exchange Act of 1934.1

The
112

settlement had both financial and non-financial components.
First, the collective settlement amount for the fifteen sanctioned
financial institutions was $13.375 million."3 Secondly, the SEC
issued an order requiring that financial institutions provide all
customers and broker-dealers with a "written description
of the
14
firms' material auction practices and procedures."

1

107. See Lee, supra note 3.
108. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
109. Lee, supra note 3. As part of the $13.375 million settlement, the SEC
identified nine common practices among issuing financial institutions that constituted
manipulation of the auction process: (1) "completion of open or market bids"; (2)
"bids to set a 'market rate"'; (3) "bids to prevent all-hold auctions; (4) "prioritization
of bids"; (5) "submission or revision of bids after deadlines"; (6) "allocation of
securities" to certain investors rather than by the prescribed pro rata formula that is
to be used when there are too many bids at the clearing rate"; (7) allowing bids to be
revoked; (8) "express or tacit understandings to provide higher returns" by "delaying
the settlement date for certain investors"; and (9) "providing different price talk to
different investors." Id.
110. See id.
111. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-And-Desist Proceedings, Making
Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-And-Desist Order Pursuant
To Section 8A of the Securities Act Of 1933 and Section 15(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 8684, Release No. 5388, Release No. 33-684,
Release No. 34-5388, 2006 WL 1490228 (May 31, 2006).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The SEC's Recent Auctions With Respect to Auction Rate Securities:Auction
Rate Securities Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv. 110th Cong.
(2008) [hereinafter SEC's Recent Actions] (Written Testimony of Linda Chatman
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Potentially more important to financial institutions in the
current crisis, however, are two things that the SEC order did not
include. First, the 2006 settlement did not include a written or
financial sanction for selling auction-rate securities as "cash
equivalents" despite the fact that the "Big Four" accounting
firms115 had interpreted the Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards 95 not to include auction-rate securities as "cash" or
"cash equivalents" and instructed their clients, including the
respective banks, to change their practices during 2004 and 2005.116
Second, the official release did not require firms to disclose to
clients either their involvement in preventing auction failures or
that the banks could cease intervention at any time, likely causing
higher rates of auction failure." Finally, it should be noted that
critics have argued that relative to the size and profits of the
issuing banks, fines, ranging from $125,000 to $1.5 million per
institution, were likely too small to make a meaningful impact on
future behavior. 1 8
V. POST-MARKET FAILURE

Unlike other types of securities, the collapse of the auctionrate securities market did not decrease the value of those
securities."9 It is critical to remember that auction failures are not
equivalent to defaults.12 ° The securities have simply become
illiquid as a result of a supply and demand imbalance. 121

Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission).
115. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and
KPMG.
116. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
117. Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-And-Desist Proceedings, Making
Findings, And Imposing Remedial Sanctions And A Cease-And-Desist Order
Pursuant To Section 8A Of The Securities Act Of 1933 And Section 15(b) Of The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 8684, Release No. 5388, Release No.
33-684, Release No. 34-5388, 2006 WL 1490228 (May 31, 2006); Cherdack et al., supra
note 3.
118. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
119. Fazio et al., supra note 21.
120. Norwood, supra note 20.
121. Id.; Fazio et al., supra note 21.
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Following the collapse of the auction-rate securities
market, investors holding auction-rate securities initially faced two
unappealing alternatives from litigation. First, investors could
continue to hold the securities and accept the "penalty" interest
rate while hoping and waiting for restoration of liquidity to the
market or a government-driven solution that would provide
liquidity. 22 The "penalty" interest rate that investors receive in the23
meantime varies widely depending on the type of issuer.
Municipality-issued auction-rate securities, which represented fifty
percent of the auction-rate securities market at the end of 2007,
have substantially higher "penalty" interest rates than those issued
by other types of issuers, such as closed-end mutual funds.24
Because of the generally high "penalty" rates for municipal
issuers, some municipalities faced a sudden increase in their cost of
capital. 125
Investors also had the option to attempt to sell the
securities in a secondary market, often at a substantial discount.
The creation of secondary markets shortly after the February
collapse has allowed some investors to liquidate their
investments. 12 Restricted Securities Trading Network has been
the most prominent secondary market since March 2008.127
Unfortunately, investors seeking to redeem their auction-rate
securities holdings in secondary markets have had to accept
substantial discounts.

'

Discounts have averaged up to ten percent

for municipal auction-rate securities, ten to twenty percent for
mutual fund-backed securities, and more than twenty-five percent
for student loan auction-rate securities."'

122. Supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
123. Supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
124. Supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
125. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3 (explaining that 50% of the auction-rate
securities market was composed of municipal issuers); Norwood, supra note 20.
126. Cherdack et al., supra note 3.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Alternative Action to Restore Liquidity

The SEC has taken a leading role in trying to address the
collapse of the auction-rate securities market. 130
While
simultaneously working alongside state Attorneys General to
investigate banks' conduct, the SEC and the Internal Revenue
Service [hereinafter IRS] have worked with bankers to review
potential rule changes and other alternative solutions that could
restore liquidity to the market.13 1
Municipal issuers facing
substantially higher interest rate payments due to the higher
"penalty" rates are anxious to restructure outstanding auction-rate
securities issues, increasing pressure on the SEC.13
Immediately following the February collapse, the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association pushed the Treasury
Department to make rule changes to smooth the path for debt
restructuring."' In March 2008, the IRS issued two rule changes to
ease the restructuring process for municipal auction-rate
securities.' 34
IRS Notice 2008-27 specifically stated that
conversions of auction-rate securities to bonds would not
constitute a reissuance for tax purposes, thereby decreasing the
disadvantageous tax consequences associated with such a
transaction.'
This has allowed some municipalities to provide
liquidity to investors through conversions to fixed-rate bonds or
variable-rate demand notes.'36 Such investment products have
provisions requiring either a third-party agent or the issuer to
purchase the bonds at par at any time, thus providing investors the
ability to redeem their investments at will. 137 IRS Notice 2008-41
temporarily waived the prohibition against municipalities
purchasing their own auction-rate securities.
The waiver, which
has now been extended indefinitely, permits municipalities to hold

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See SEC's Recent Auctions, supra note 114.
Id.; Norwood, supra note 20; see Humphreys, supra note 35.
Lee, supra note 3.
Norwood, supra note 20; see Fazio et. al., supra note 21.
Norwood, supra note 20; see Humphreys, supra note 35.
I.R.S. Notice 2008-27; see Norwood, supra note 20.
Norwood, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
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their own auction-rate securities for up to 180 days.'39 The SEC
supported the IRS's initiative by issuing a "no-action" letter
stating that it would allow issuers with the necessary capital to bid
on their own securities. 4 ° Some were concerned because the SEC
had frowned on such purchases during the 2006 joint settlement4
with auction-rate securities brokers regarding their practices. 1
Specifically, broker-dealers were concerned that such purchases
would be "construed by the SEC to constitute market
manipulation or that a broker-dealer's participation in an auction
on behalf of an issuer would violate any consent order it may have
with the SEC.' ' 1 42 This provision has allowed some liquidity
to be
43
restored to the market by allowing auctions to clear again.
The SEC has also evaluated requests from closed-end fundbacked issuers of auction-rate securities to waive some provisions
of the Investment Company Act of 1940.1" In an attempt to pacify
angry auction-rate securities holders, closed-end funds have
looked into redeeming illiquid auction-rate securities by raising
capital through the issuance of debt securities or new classes of
preferred shares. 45 Two concerns have arisen. 46 First, proposals
for closed-end funds to provide liquidity to investors by redeeming
their auction-rate shares that are classified as preferred stock have
been challenged as violating the fund's fiduciary duty to their
common share holders.'4 7 This duty to common stockholders is
codified in the 1940 Investment Company Act. 48 In an April 2008
letter to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, several members of the
House of Representatives asked the SEC to provide a view on

139. IRS Notice 2008-41; see also IRS Notice 2008-88 (extending indefinitely and
amending 2008-41).
140. Norwood, supra note 20, at 11.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Norwood, supra note 20.
144. Humphreys, supra note 35; see Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC, supra note
73.
145. Humphreys, supra note 35.
146. See Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC, supra note 73; Humphreys, supra note
35.
147. Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC, supra note 73; Humphreys, supra note 35.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006); see Norwood, supra note 20.
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whether the fiduciary duty to common stock holders would in fact
be breached by redemption of preferred stock shares.'49
Secondly, the Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates
the issuing of debt or preferred shares by closed-end funds by
requiring that a fund maintain a post-issuance asset-coverage ratio
of 200 percent for preferred securities and 300 percent for debt
securities.5
In order to raise money to redeem auction-rate
securities, several funds have sought a waiver from the SEC to
issue preferred shares or debt without complying with the assetcoverage ratio requirements in order to raise money to redeem
auction-rate securities. 5 ' At least one, Eaton Vance Management,
was provided such a waiver to issue preferred securities.'52 In
effect, this wavier served as a green light for other closed-end
funds to make plans to request such a waiver and plan to issue new
classes of preferred shares or other debt securities.'53
Broker-dealers have also faced challenges when trying to
redeem their clients' auction-rate securities holdings.'
Firms are
facing capital limitations due to the financial crisis and thus have
limited funding available for voluntary matters such as the
purchasing of illiquid securities from their clients.' Furthermore,
broker-dealers are constrained by the Federal Reserve's
Regulation W."' Regulation W limits the amount of credit a
financial institution can lend to a client if it owns securities issued
by that client in its own portfolio.'57
VI. INVESTIGATIONS & LITIGATION

Three types of suits have been filed against issuing banks
and their employees related to the auction-rate securities market
collapse. First, criminal investigations have been launched and, in
149. Lawmakers Seek Input From SEC, supra note 73.
150. Investment Company Act of 1940 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006); see Humphreys,
supra note 35.
151. Humphreys, supra note 35.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Norwood, supra note 20.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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at least one case, charges have been filed by both the Department
of Justice and the SEC against individual brokers and banking
Second, state
executives, as well as financial institutions.
Attorneys General, the SEC, and other groups have commenced
civil investigations into the marketing practices of financial
institutions selling auction-rate securities. 9 Such investigations
have resulted in civil suits against both issuing banks as well their
holding illiquid auctionemployees.6 Finally, individual investors
1 61
rate securities have also filed suits.

A.

CriminalInvestigations & Suits

Criminal investigations have been launched in cases where
brokers appear to have committed egregious fraud.162 In one such
case, filed on September 6, 2008, two Credit Suisse brokers
allegedly misrepresented the issuer of auction-rate securities and
in some cases told clients that the auction-rate securities they were
purchasing were an entirely different investment.'63 The SEC's
complaint states that the brokers purchased more than $1 billion
of auction-rate securities backed by mortgages when their clients
had only given them permission to purchase less risky studentloan-backed auction-rate securities. 164 Due to the increased risk,
the brokers were incentivized to sell auction-rate securities
because they commanded substantially higher broker fees due to

158. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Tzolov, 08 Civ. 7699 (S.D.N.Y 2008); Amir
Efrati, U.S. Auction-Rate Investigation Picks Up Steam, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122291293581297001.html [hereinafter
Investigation Picks Up Steam]; Malini Manickavasagam, Ex-Credit Suisse Brokers
Face Charges Over ARS Sales Against Customers' Wishes, BNA BANKING DAILY,
Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/bnkd.htm [hereinafter Charges
Over ARS Sales].
159. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
160. Id. (stating that several states which are members of North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) have created a joint task force to
investigate the collapse of the auction-rate securities market).
161. Infra notes 238-253 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Tzolov at 1-2, 08 Civ. 7699 (S.D.N.Y 2008); Charges Over ARS Sale,
supra note 158.
163. Tzolov at 4-15, 08 Civ. 7699 (S.D.N.Y 2008); Charges Over ARS Sale, supra
note 158.
164. Tzolov at 4, 08 Civ. 7699 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
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the ecurties
incease
" 165The complaint also alleges that the
the securities'
increased risk.
brokers sent, or instructed associates to send, e-mails that
confirmed purchases of student-loan-backed
auction-rate
6
16
securities.
On account of the failure of the auction-rate
securities auctions for risky mortgage-backed securities in August
2007, the clients were left with more than $817 million in such
securities that they had never authorized their brokers to
purchase.167
The Department of Justice also launched two criminal
investigations as of early January 2009: (1) whether Lehman
Brothers defrauded its clients and; (2) whether David Schulman, a
former UBS executive, was involved in auction-rate securitiesrelated insider trading.'68 Specifically, prosecutors are gathering
evidence regarding whether Lehman Brothers brokers put
auction-rate securities into the account eof/ 169
a client, the Maher
brothers, despite concern of a market failure. As a result of the
auction-rate securities market collapse, the Maher brothers lost
access to $286 million. 70 Prosecutors investigated whether brokers
used the brothers' money to buy auction-rate securities to prevent
17
auction failure. 1

B.

Civil Liability Overview

This note focuses on two aspects of financial institutions'
potential liability relating to selling and marketing auction-rate
securities prior to the collapse of the market: (1) the marketing of
auction-rate securities as liquid, cash-equivalent investments; and
(2) the non-disclosure of intervention by banks to prevent market
failure or the failure to disclose that the banks were not obligated
to continue to do so. 172 The many adversaries of issuing financial
165. Id. at 4-7.
166. Id. at 4-5.
167. Id. at 2.
168. Investigation Picks Up Steam, supra note 158; see also, supra notes 88-94 and
accompanying text (discussing David Schulman's contradictory interactions with
UBS's risk management department and its brokers).
169. InvestigationPicks Up Steam, supra note 158.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
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institutions believe that these actions amount to misrepresentation
and/or deception and thus civil liability for fraud.'
Allegations
also include charges by investors that the aforementioned activity
was illegal
under federal law, notably the Securities Exchange
4
17

Act.

The most common allegation against issuing financial
institutions is that brokers marketed and sold the securities to
investors as liquid, cash-equivalent investments that were virtually
identical to money market funds. Furthermore, claimants allege
that market support to prevent auction failure was either expressly
guaranteed or implied by brokers. 6 Survey results show that
nearly seventy percent of investors believed that "auction support"
was "implied" by dealers."' Seventeen percent said they were
"explicitly" told that the "bank would ensure that auctions did not
8
fail.

C.

,

17

Federal & State Investigations & Suits

The SEC and FINRA as well as several state Attorneys
General launched investigations into the practices of financial
institutions regarding auction-rate securities during the months
following the collapse of the auction-rate securities market.7 9
With the exception of New York, notable state action occurred in
conjunction with the North American Securities Administrators
Association [hereinafter NASAA].'9
Nine states that are
members of the association

l18

formed the ARS Taskforce to
182

coordinate their investigations.
By late July, New York
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo had filed a lawsuit against one
173. Lockman, supra note 10, at 10.
174. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Erin Coe, Customers Had Misconceptions About ARS Market: Survey,
LAw360, June 30, 2008, http://financialservices.law360.com/articles/60739.
178. Id.
179. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
180. Id.
181. Id. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Texas, and Washington. Id.
182. Id.
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of the largest auction-rate securities players, UBS, accusing the
firm of falsely marketing the securities."'
While much attention focused on investigations, suits, and
settlements involving the world's largest financial institutions, the
actions of smaller brokers and consequences for their clients have
caught the attention of FINRA. 184 Whereas the SEC was primarily
focused on select large firms, FINRA aimed to "protect[]
additional investors and restore[] funds to a broader span of
customers."185
Investigators are concentrating in part on whether brokers'
actions violated one of two sections of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.186 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits illegal

deception and manipulation by securities brokers. Section 10(b)
of the Act makes it illegal to use "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention" of the rules issued by the
SEC "for the protection of investors." 188 Moreover, Section 20(a)
of the Act establishes joint and several liability for all those
participating in illegal actions under the Act.189 One of the
questions that courts would have to answer if such a case is
litigated is whether or not the broker's actions rose to the level of a
"manipulative" or "deceptive" device that would be in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act.' 90

The strength of the claims that issuing financial institutions
acted fraudulently and/or violated the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 depends on several factors: what the broker communicated to
the client, how such investments were noted on account
statements, and what written materials describing the investments
were provided to investors to assess the validity of the statutory
183. Somers, supra note 93.
184. Breakdown of Auction Rate Securities Markets: Auction Rate Securities
Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement
of Susan Merrill, Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority) [hereinafter Merrill].
185. Id.
186. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
187. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (2006).
188. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j)(b) (2006).
189. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(t)(a) (2006).
190. See Consol. Amended Complaint, In re Citigroup Auction Rate Securities
Litigation, 08 Civ. 3095 (LTS)(FM), (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008).
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violations."' The strength of each claim will also depend on the
type of investor, as institutional investors are generally expected to
be savvier, and whether the investor can establish tangible adverse
consequences due to the lack of liquidity in the auction-rate
securities market. 192
D.

Settlements

The civil investigations and suits filed by the SEC, state
Attorneys General, and other organizations have resulted in
sizable settlements that will restore liquidity to many auction-rate
securities holders.' 93 However, the settlements only cover a
portion of the $330 billion of illiquid assets.'9 For example, as of
September 18, 2008, sixty-two percent of the originally-outstanding
$166 billion of municipal auction-rate securities had been
refinanced or plans had been made for refinancing and forty
percent of the original $64 billion of closed-end fund auction-rate
securities had been redeemed or plans had been made to redeem
them.9 However, by the end of 2008, nearly $200 billion of the
$330 billion market had been recovered, leaving $135 billion
frozen. 96
Citigroup's August 7, 2008, joint settlement with both state
Attorneys General and the SEC commenced a period of hasty
settlements by the world's largest financial institutions.'9 During
the subsequent two months, Bank of America, UBS, Morgan
191. Fazio et al., supra note 21.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Thomsen, supra note 114.
195. Id.
196. Beth Healy, $135b Still Frozen by an Early '08 Debacle Later Events Eclipsed
the Auction-Rate Mess, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2008, at B5, available at 2008
WLNR 24979449.
197. See generally Malini Manickavasagam, Citigroup Agrees With SEC to
Liquidate All Auction Securities Sold to All Investors, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 8,
2008, http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/bnkd.htm [hereinafter Citigroup Agrees
With SEC] (discussing Citigroup's August 2008 settlement with the SEC); Melvin &
Duffield, supra note 3 (discussing generally auction-rate securities settlements);
Jeffery Vetter, Auction Rate Securities-Recent Settlements With SEC And Other
Regulators, MONDAQ, Aug. 12, 2008, 2008 WLNR 15074865 (discussing how UBS's
August 2008 settlement with the SEC will "pave the way" for recovery by
institutional and retail investors).
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Stanley, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, and Wachovia each settled
with at least one governmental body or FINRA. 98 The SEC was
directly involved in the Bank of America, Citigroup, UBS,
Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch settlements. 99 The settlements
represent the largest return of money to investors in the SEC's
history. 00
There are six common features of these large
1
settlements.
First, the principal feature of each settlement is a
repurchase of auction-rate securities by the issuing bank.02 These
buybacks have been restricted to retail investors and in some cases
also charitable organizations and small to mid-sized business. In
most cases, the sizes of the buybacks have been limited for each
client.2 4 For example, both J.P. Morgan and Bank of America
have agreed to only buy back up to $10 million worth of auction-

198. See Chad Bray & Mike Barris, Crisis on Wall Street: BofA, RBC to Buy Back
Auction-Rates, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122348603522215875.html (discussing Bank of America's and Royal Bank
of Canada's settlements); BofA to Buy Back Auction-Rate Securities, CHARLOTTE
Bus. J., Sept. 10, 2008, http://charlotte.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2008/09/08/
daily3l.html (discussing Bank of America's settlement); Rachel Breitman, Bank of
America in $4.5 Billion Auction-Rate Settlement, AM. LAW., Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202424434399 (discussing Bank of America's
settlement); John Herzfeld, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase Agree to Pay $60
Million in ARS Settlements, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.bna.
com/products/corplaw/bnkd.htm (discussing Morgan Stanley's and JP Morgan
Chase's settlement); Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra note 197 (discussing
Citigroup's settlement); Malini Manickavasagam, PreliminarySettlement With Merrill
Would Bring Over $8 Million to ARS Investors, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 25 2008,
http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/bnkd.htm [hereinafter Preliminary Settlement
With Merill] (discussing Merrill Lynch's settlement); Urda, supra note 177 (discussing
Morgan Stanley's and UBS's settlement). See generally Vetter, supra note 197
(discussing the settlements involving financial institutions that issued or sold auctionrate securities).
199. See Bray & Barris, supra note 198 (discussing Bank of America's settlement
with the SEC); Herzfeld & Joyce, supra note 93 (discussing Wachovia's settlement
with the SEC); Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra note 197 (discussing Citigroup's
settlement with the SEC); Preliminary Settlement With Merrill, supra note 198
(discussing Merrill Lynch's settlement with the SEC); Melvin & Duffield, supra note
3 (discussing the SEC's involvement); Vetter, supra note 197 (discussing the SEC's
involvement in obtaining settlements for investors in auction-rate securities).
200. Citigroup and UBS Agree to Buy Back Risky Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2008, at B8, available at http:l/www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/l12auctions.html.
201. See infra notes 202-237 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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rate securities from each client. 25 Bank of America made an
exception for charitable organizations from whom the bank agreed
••• 206
to repurchase up to $25 million worth of auction-rate securities.
As of the end of 2008, Bank of America had repurchased ninetythree percent of the $4.5 billion worth of auction-rate securities
held by retail investors while $5 billion of auction-rate securities
held by institutional investors, those with holdings in excess of $10
million, was still illiquid. 27 Despite the limitations, the buybacks
represent a sizable portion of banks' outstanding auction-rate
securities issues. 2 8 For example, the direct buyback will affect
holders of more than $7 billion of the $20 billion worth of auctionrate securities that Citigroup had issued.201 UBS's large $19 billion
settlement stands as a notable exception as it is the only settlement
that includes an agreement to buy back securities from all
investors who purchased securities from UBS within the
designated period.210 Usually, the deadlines for buybacks were set
within three to six months of the settlement dates, which ranged
from August to October 2008. 2l' Nevertheless, several settlements
also included a provision for the banks to provide no-interest loans
to clients to provide them the necessary liquidity as the banks
212
work through the process of repurchasing the securities.
Furthermore, FINRA also formally reminded financial institutions
to adopt procedures to ensure that customers are treated fairly and
impartially.2 13 Unfortunately, the settlements have left even some
retail investors without recourse. 2" For example, a Massachusetts
law professor, Irene Scharf, had invested $75,000 in auction-rate
205. Breitman, supra note 198; Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, JPMorgan Chase
to Settle with State Securities Regulators and Offer to Purchase Certain Customers'
Auction Rate Securities (Aug. 14, 2008), http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorgan
chase/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=328180.
206. Breitman, supra note 198.
207. Healy, supra note 196.
208. Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra note 197; Vetter, supra note 197; see supra
notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
209. Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra note 197 (discussing Citigroup's settlement
with the SEC).
210. Healy, supra note 196; Come In From The Cold, supra note 1.
211. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
212. See Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
213. Merrill, supra note 184.
214. Come In From The Cold, supra note 1.
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securities in 2005 to pay for her son's college tuition on the advice
of her UBS broker.215 In 2007, that broker moved to SmithBarney
and Scharf moved her account to SmithBarney.116 The settlement
reached with UBS, however, only cover investors who still held
their securities at UBS whereas the settlement reached with
SmithBarney only applied to those who purchased the securities
through SmithBarney, thus leaving Scharf holding illiquid
securities with no reasonable redemption option available.217
Second, while protections for institutional investors are not
as strong, settlements have usually included either a good-faith
promise for each bank to use its best efforts to liquidate auctionrate securities held by institutional investors or a longer-term
deadline to liquidate the holdings of institutional investors. 218 Both
J.P. Morgan and Citigroup, for example, agreed to "use (their)
best efforts" to provide liquidity for institutional holders of
auction-rate securities and set a "goal" of addressing all liquidity
219
UBS, on the other hand, set a finite
issues by the end of 2009.
goal of liquidating all institutional auction-rate securities holdings
by the end of 2009.220 The dichotomy in banks' willingness to
include retail and other small investors in settlements while not
including institutional investors may be attributed to both the
impactful effect that retail investors would have "on the stand"
should the investors proceed with litigation and also because
institutional investors are naturally expected to have more
sophisticated knowledge of investment products.221
Third, auction-rate securities holders who sold their
securities at a loss in the secondary market after the collapse of the
auction-rate securities market in early February 2008 will be able
to recover the losses that they incurred by selling at a discount to
achieve the liquidity as they had expected.222 In other words,
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra note 197; Preliminary Settlement With
Merrill,supra note 198; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
219. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, supra note 205; Citigroup Agrees With SEC,
supra note 197.
220. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
221. Lockman, supra note 10, at 10.
222. Bray & Barris, supra note 198; Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, supra note
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investors will receive compensation for the difference between the
price at which they sold their auction-rate securities in the
secondary market and the par value of their securities.223
Fourth, several banks have agreed to reimburse refinancing
fees for certain issuers who recently refinanced their auction-rate
securities, issued on or after August 1, 2007.224 The relief is

somewhat limited, however.225 J.P. Morgan and Bank of America,
for example, agreed to such a provision only for municipal issuers
of auction-rate securities.226
Fifth, several settlements have provided for use of a special
arbitration process specifically for auction-rate securities claims to
award consequential damages to investors for harm associated
with the unexpected illiquidity of their investments.2

7

The

arbitration process will be run by FINRA, which is the largest
private regulator of securities firms.228
While banks have generally been unwilling to publicly
accept liability publicly or in the settlement agreements, the
FINRA arbitration process will not allow the banks to dispute
liability.229 Banks will only be able to challenge the claims for
230
Cases in which the
consequential damages on their merits.
damages claimed are less than $50,000 will be heard by a public
arbitrator, whereas cases in which the damages claimed are greater
than $50,000 will be heard by two public arbitrators and one nonpublic arbitrator. 2 1

A new special arbitration proceeding for

claims greater than $1 million may be heard, by agreement, by a
panel of three public arbitrators.232 Conflict of interest checks will
205; Herzfeld, supra note 198; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
223. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
224. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
225. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
226. Bray & Barris, supra note 198; Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, supra note
205.
227. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note 197.
228. Merrill, supra note 184; Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; Vetter, supra note
197.
229. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3; see also Citigroup Agrees With SEC, supra
note 198.
230. See FINRA Provides Details on Special Arbitration Procedure for ARS
Consequential Damages,U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2008, 2008 WLNR 24126091.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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be run to ensure that no non-public arbitrator has sold auctionrate securities, worked for a firm that sold auction rate securities,
or supervised someone who did.233 As of the end of November
2008, 275 cases had been filed to be arbitrated by FINRA.23
Finally, most of the settlements have included civil
penalties paid directly to the states or to NASAA, which has
joined forces with several states for auction-rate securities
investigations. 35 Civil penalties in the first wave of settlements
have already reached $150 million per bank, paid by UBS and split
evenly between NASAA and the State of New York.236 In this
case, like most, the SEC deferred assessing a penalty.237
E.

Investor Suits

Due to the large settlements aimed at providing relief for
retail investors as well as the frequent use of arbitration, there
have been relatively few suits filed by individuals against issuing
financial institutions. 238 As of mid-December 2008, twenty class

action suits related to the collapse of the auction-rate securities
market had been filed during 2008.239 A small number of suits filed

independently by investors were also filed during 2008. 240
Nevertheless, it is anticipated that government investigations and
resulting settlements will encourage other investors to file their
own suits. 241 Furthermore, given most of the settlements' targeted

scope of coverage, the holders of a large portion of illiquid
242
auction-rate securities remain without a clear avenue for relief.
Specifically, institutional investors and those holding auction-rate

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Supra note 218.
236. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
237. Id.
238. See Suit Against UBS, supra note 14.
239. Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, 2008 Trends in Securities Class
Actions, MONDAQ, Dec. 18, 2008, 2008 WLNR 24395414.
240. See Girard, supra note 14.
241. Melvin & Duffield, supra note 3.
242. Girard, supra note 14.
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securities sold by "downstream" brokers generally lack an option
to restore liquidity to their investments.243
Nevertheless, some investors have achieved preliminary
success in their suits against issuing banks.24 One institutional
investor, New York-based Plug Power Inc., which invested $62.9
million in student-loan-backed auction-rate securities, achieved
preliminary success in pursuing its suit against UBS for
misrepresenting the safety of auction-rate securities.245
On
September 17, 2008, a federal judge dismissed UBS's motion to
dismiss the case.246 The bellwether suit was watched closely by
other institutional investors, many of whom are considering
litigation as a means of restoring liquidity to their auction-rate
securities. 24' As previously noted, institutional investors' interest
in litigation stems in part from the insufficiency of settlements
reached by the SEC, FINRA, and state Attorneys General.248
George Capinello of Boies, Schiller, & Flexner, who represented
Plug Power Inc., said: "We need the funds before 2010, and they're
not providing us a [guarantee] that they will be able to pay us in
2010. ,249
The suit alleged that UBS violated Plug Power's
instructions not to invest in auction-rate securities that were
subject to interest-rate caps and that UBS misrepresented auctionrate securities as "'highly liquid and safe and that they were
250
virtually the equivalent to money market investments or cash.'
Plug Power Inc. and UBS reached a settlement on December 15,
2008, that included an agreement that UBS repurchase the entirety
of the company's auction-rate securities holdings between 2010
and 2012 and provide a no-interest loan equivalent to the value of
the securities in the meantime.2 1 The suit was "dismissed with
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245. Id.
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248. Id.; supra notes 193-237 and accompanying text.
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prejudice.,

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 13

25 2

"retail"

Class

actions
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VII. CONCLUSION
Given the size of the auction-rate securities market, the
litigation fallout from the market's collapse will likely continue for
Whether issuing institutions with
the foreseeable future.
regulatory agency support can help restore liquidity to the market
via alternative solutions will likely influence the volume of
litigation and the cost of settlements during the next year. The
turmoil in the financial markets and global recession may render
restoring liquidity to the market a low priority for regulators and
banks.
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